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Abstract: Background: Initiatives to tackle micronutrient deficiencies (MNDs) in low-and
middle-income countries (LMICs) have increased steadily in recent years. Commodities such
as staple foods (e.g., cereals) and condiments (e.g., salt) have been targeted as ‘vehicles’ for industrial
fortification through numerous projects and initiatives. However, mixed experiences with delivery,
coverage and sustainability have been found. Methods: Using an online survey of 71 key stakeholders
(from 35 countries) consisting of the public/private sector, academia and civil society, this study
sought to unpack the ‘business model’ for fortification initiatives to identify the key drivers of
success and constraints faced by stakeholders in LMICs. Bivariate analysis was conducted to identify
factors associated with the coverage of the target market and the perceived success and sustainability
of fortification initiatives. Results: We identified four key factors contributing to the success of
fortification initiatives. The first involves the size of the firm. Large firms had a significantly higher
(p < 0.05) self-sustaining index (perceived level of sustainability of the fortification initiative) than
smaller sized firms. In addition, a higher perceived success score (p < 0.05) was associated with
non-targeted initiatives compared to those specifically targeted at a certain cohort of the population,
further illustrating the benefits of producing at scale. Secondly, a significant relationship was found
between whether standards were enacted and the coverage of the target market by the project/firm
(p < 0.05).). The third key factor relates to the ability to source adequate testing for the fortified produce
in-house. A positive correlation was found for post-mix in-factory testing and the self-sustaining index
(p < 0.05). Finally, delays to importation and high charges were cited as key constraints to the use of
premix. Conclusions: We argue therefore that a successful ‘business model’ for industrial fortification
initiatives invariably consist of: (i) the involvement of larger sized firms that have the advantage
of benefiting from economies of scale; (ii) the availability and application of agreed standards by
the producer; (iii) high quality assurance/compliance monitoring (including post-mix testing where
relevant), and; (iv) the ability to procure premix in a timely/cost-effective manner. These criteria are
likely to be important factors that contribute to the success of fortification initiatives in LMICs.
Keywords: industrial fortification; business models; scale; standards; testing
1. Introduction
Food systems in many low and middle income countries (LMICs) are faced with increasing
challenges to deliver nutritionally adequate diets including population growth, urbanisation,
and climate change [1,2]. Coupled with this, approximately 3 million child deaths per year relate to
deficiencies of essential vitamins and minerals such as Vitamin A, D, iron and zinc [1]. Initiatives to
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tackle micronutrient deficiencies (MNDs) in LMICs have increased steadily in recent years [3].
Commodities such as staple foods (e.g., cereals) and condiments (e.g., salt) have been targeted as
‘vehicles’for industrial fortification (fortification requires suitable food vehicles, i.e., those foods that
are widely consumed and therefore have the ability to be reached/accessed by the most amount of
people—though does not aim to increase consumption of the product) whereby one or more minerals
or vitamins are added to the commonly consumed foods [4]. Benefits from industrial fortification
initiatives have been found in LMICs such as improvements to food safety [3] and as with the case
of wheat flour in Morocco, where there was a significant reduction in the prevalence of anaemia in
children aged 3 to 5 years [5]. Furthermore, a recent systematic review of 80 countries found that
flour fortification has had a significant impact on reducing the prevalence of low ferritin among
women [6]. In contrast, a number of national fortification initiatives have had limited impact and failed
to reach very remote communities or scale due to a myriad of issues including inadequate funding,
project design, weak governance and compliance issues [5,7,8]. A lack of research surrounding the
drivers of the success and failure of food fortification initiatives includes limited research on the range
and effectiveness of the business models (the terms business models and delivery models are used
interchangeably throughout the manuscript—we define business model as “A specific combination of
resources which through transactions generate value for customers and the organization” [9].) used to
deliver the expected fortification results. In recent years, extensive reviews of fortification programmes
in LMICs and a global mapping exercise have been conducted [3]. though little has been documented
surrounding the views of stakeholders involved in these projects. Recent research has also highlighted
that many LMICs can benefit substantially from industrial fortification initiatives, yet these are seldom
pursued [2]. This study forms part of a larger research project with the overall purpose of the research
project to identify the business models that drive the success or failure of food fortification initiatives.
This study, however, seeks to unpack the ‘business model’ of fortification initiatives to better identify
what works and where bottlenecks remain in order to guide programme implementation and enhance
the sustainability of programme interventions.
1.1. Background of Research Project
This research responds to a wider global effort to use the power of food fortification to address
key aspects of the Sustainable Development Goals [10] and a widely held belief that fortification is
more cost-effective than alternative solutions in reducing micronutrient deficiencies (MNDs). There are
global efforts to expand investment, scale and impact using these approaches. For example, the Global
Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), the Flour Fortification Initiative and the Nutrient Foundation.
There are also numerous national level, donor, NGO and private sector-led efforts in this field [11].
As part of this, the European Commission (EC) has established the Food Fortification Advisory
Services (2FAS) to contribute to strengthening food fortification programmes through collecting and
disseminating knowledge and promoting action and commitment at the global and national levels.
This effort by major supporters of food fortification has led to a desire to better understand the dynamics
and drivers of food fortification sustainability through different business models and approaches.
The research project was comprised of two phases. These are a review phase and a formative
research phase. The initial results of a comprehensive review of literature [12] suggested a framework
for the analysis of different business models. This was based on drivers identified by the authors which
showed that the scale, technology, incentives, governance, policy and regulation, maturity of business,
supply of inputs, demand for finished products and form of intervention (e.g., output vs. process)
were all important to success and failure (Figure 1).
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1.2. Busines Viability Factors Explored
The concept of a central business case is premised on financial viability being at the core of every
business model in some form or another. Failure of income to exceed costs results in firm failure.
This ‘Central Business Case’ is at the heart of all food fortification efforts. Viability can be assured in
many ways ranging from a full subsidy from the state or another actor, to a completely market-based
approach with costs being subsumed by non-state actors such as farmers, processors, retailers and/or
consumers. The subsidy of food fortification comes in many forms and for many reasons: to promote
start-up and adoption; to over-come scaling and investment challenges; to address aspects of market
failure and to respond to needs in wider society. States are sometimes ‘fortification takers’ in that
they are unable to implement sufficient control over their domestic food policy to manage initiatives
and therefore accept policies from private or non-state actors. This is more common in fragile states.
Each business format or model is in itself located within a ‘product environment’. For example,
fortified cereals compete with substitutes in the same market space, so to compete in this product
environment the same business case needs to be made with the viability of supply and demand assured
for business success. In this context, managing business risk and competition is important with firms
responding to incentives that match these challenges. Fortification programmes are also set in a
wider societal context where decisions have to be made between investments that bring about societal
benefits, such as improved health, and externalities, including the distorting impacts of subsidies.
Added complexity comes from the range of different business starting points: not all fortification
initiatives are ‘start-ups’; sectors are governed differently (some highly concentrated and associated,
others dispersed and uncoordinated); and approaches to fortification business building vary greatly,
ranging from being purely factor driven (e.g., responding to targets) to society driven (e.g., responding
to needs, behaviours and trends).
1.3. Business Models Defined
Lalani et al., 2019 [12] in a review of the efficacy of the different models used in fortification
highlighted four different types: (i) public-led, (ii) private-led, (iii) multi-sector partnerships and
(iv) community-led models. Public-sector models are national fortification strategies which typically
include mandatory fortification (legislation), enforceable regulation and strong quality assurance
and compliance. For example, in Uzbekistan, national fortification programmes have supported
millers with social marketing; mandating packaging of flour and subsidised laboratory equipment to
improve compliance [5]. Private sector models of fortification follow voluntary fortification and are
based on the commercial market development of their products. They may, however, benefit from
input from the public sector in the form of incentives (e.g., tax related or equipment/training, etc.).
Voluntary fortification has been successfully piloted at a regional scale in India (e.g., vegetable oil)
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which influenced the government to introduce mandatory legislation [3]. Multi sector partnerships are
those which consist of a variety of stakeholders, e.g., public sector bodies, the private sector and civil
society organisations. For example, in recent years, national fortification alliances (NFAs) have emerged
(e.g., Senegal, Tanzania) [3]. An example of a community model can be found in Senegal where mills
were ‘community managed’ businesses with the profits being kept by the operators [13]. As the
central business case (Figure 1) shows, depending on the model, ‘food vehicle’, the legislation and
country setting can be overlap among various levels of engagement. For example, four levels/pathways
have been suggested to scale business engagement in sustainable development [14]. Level 1 refers to
cooperation along value chains (with minimum involvement from the private sector towards sustainable
development including nutrition). Level 2 relates to project-level partnerships such as linkage with
investors, governments and research centres, whilst level 3 is more organised with industry-level
alliances and a stronger commitment/organised approach to sustainable development goals). Level 4
consists of multi-stakeholder institution platforms and networks which can be formalised or informal
platforms and consist of high commitment to sustainable goals and development. Finally, level 5
consists of coordination between all the different levels (levels are depicted under partnerships and
coordination 1–5 in Figure 1) some can be led by business, government or civil society [14].
Building on [12], a conceptual framework in the literature review suggested questions, themes,
and areas for further investigation, and these were woven into a question narrative (see Table 1).
Table 1. The relationship between business context, hypothesised drivers of business success and
failure, and fortification business contexts.
Questionnaire Theme Context Potential Drivers
Background information: respondent type,















Output vs. process orientation
Technology: premix and tech
importation challenges
Technology
Policy and regulation Tradable vs. non-tradable
Standards, regulation and business models Policy and regulation Voluntary vs. mandatory
Furthermore, this study focusses primarily on the level of regulation, infrastructure and coverage
in relation to industrial fortification initiatives [3], has identified ‘key success factors and preconditions’
for large scale fortification, including clear legislation and appropriate standards, as well as the
tracking/reporting of the overall coverage of the population using the fortified foods and the need
for product quality safety monitoring. Likewise [15], has hypothesised with reference to large scale
universal salt iodisation (USI) that four groupings exist: (i) countries with an optimal level of coverage
(scaled-up programmes) but where focus on disadvantaged/marginalised groupings needs attention;
(ii) countries in scale-up phase, with limited coverage and where the strengthening of value chains
will improve the quality/quantity of production (e.g., capacity of producers, quality assurance) and
coverage among market segments; (iii) countries where no policies exist and awareness among key
stakeholders is paramount (e.g., public, private, civic, academic sectors) and; (iv) fragile states where
the enabling environment is not conducive to high coverage rates and exacerbated by governance
issues and political/civil strife/natural disasters, etc.
2. Methods
Using findings from the desk phase [12] (i.e., literature review), a survey was developed and
administered online using SurveyMonkey Inc® (San Mateo, CA, USA). Snowball sampling was
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used to identify the key stakeholders and those in their own sphere/network from the public/private
sectors and civil society across a range of geographies. In addition, existing literature on fortification
and biofortification was used to identify those that were involved in the design/implementation of
fortification/biofortification projects in academia. In total, 500 stakeholders were contacted with an
overall response rate of 21%, i.e., 103 respondents (67 males and 31 females) completed the survey from
39 different countries across sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and South America). We chose to report
on 71 stakeholders (from 35 countries) involved in fortification initiatives for this study. One additional
survey response was excluded as it was incomplete. The survey was confidential and respondents
were anonymised and only identified by a unique identifier. Ethics approval was granted by the
University of Greenwich Ethics Committee. We took a ‘projectised’ approach to analysing the data.
This means that it was assumed that many of the individuals had knowledge of specific time-bound
projects with defined objectives and results. To encourage greater participation, we asked respondents
to focus on only one example where they had the most experience.
The survey drew its themes from the conceptual framework that emerged from the literature
review (see Figure 1). Topics including: (i) the types of projects respondents are involved in; (ii) the
level of standards/legislation applied; (iii) funding sources of projects, (iv) targeting and (v) premix
usage and technology. Additionally, perceptions of, for example, the sustainability, and success of
projects, the level of compliance monitoring were also gathered through rating/ranking scales in order
to allow for the exploration of bivariate associations and statistical inference. A few open-ended
questions were also included to gain stakeholder views on, e.g., reasons for the success of certain
projects. Thematic analysis was used to code the data and then search for key themes/sub themes [16].
2.1. Data Analysis and Scoring Used
The R software [17] was used to perform non-parametric tests (e.g., Kruskal–Wallis, Wilcoxon,
Spearman tests) for inference, given that the data were mainly based on scale/ranking questions [17].
Figures were produced using STATA version 15 (StataCorp., College Station, TX, USA). One-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used for the comparison of group means. Several scores/indexes
were created to measure the success and sustainability of the fortification initiatives. Likewise, a success
index was used to measure the perceived success of the projects stakeholders had been involved in
(success index: 1 = failure, 2 = too early to tell 3 = success). Similarly, the sustainability of these
projects/business models was also measured on a scale of 1–4 (i.e., 1 refers to a model that is no longer
functional or requires 100% subsidy; 2. it requires funds mostly from public subsidy; 3. reliant mostly
on the sales of the product; 4. 100% self-sufficient). Finally, the coverage of the target market was
also measured (1 = 0%—no production at the end of project; 2 = 0–33% some—limited sustainable
production achieved; 3 = 33–66% some—most markets supplied, but not all, 4 = 66–100% most—many
markets receiving and using fortified food, but some gaps; 5 = 100%—all domestic food of this type
fortified with no subsidy). A full list of the variables used in the analysis is presented in Table 2.
2.2. Limitations
This study is not without limitations. Selection bias may be the predominant limitation given
the survey design may have only selected those respondents which agreed with fortification and are
likely to be more positive than those that are not involved. Potential bias could also relate to the roles
stakeholders play in the project, which could have a bearing on their responses/views. The sample size
was also small and the universe unknown. Whilst we attempt to explore statistical inference, we do not
claim to provide evidence-based solutions. Only a small proportion of the respondents shared their
views on the success of fortification initiatives, thus the interpretation of these results (stakeholders’
views section) should be treated with caution.
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Table 2. Survey variables and description.
Variables Description of Variable/Code in Survey
Project name Name of the project/firm involved in fortification
Region Continent and country of the project were recorded
Commodities fortified (these were then disaggregated
by type (e.g., wheat flour and maize flour, etc.)
1 = Fortified cereals and flours
2 = Fortified complementary foods




2 = Private investment,
3 = Public funding
4 = Other
Source of secondary funding
1 = Donor,
2 = Private investment
3 = Public funding
4 = Other
Legislation
1 = Voluntary (e.g., business can add or not),
2 = Mandatory (e.g., business must add by law)
3 = Other
Standards
1 = Approved standards
2 = Voluntary standard
3 = No standard
Coverage of the target market
1 = 0%—no production at end of project
2 = 0–33% some—limited sustainable production achieved
3 = 33–66% much—Some markets supplied, but not all
4 = 66–100% most—Many markets receiving and using fortified food, but some
gaps
5 = 100%—all domestic food of this type fortified with no subsidy
Size of firm (number of employees)
1 = Large firm = >250
2 = Medium firm = >50 <250
3 = SME = >10 <50
4 = Small firm < 10
5 = Other
Type of business model
1 = Value chain level collaboration (involving collaboration by different actors in the
same value chain)
2 = Project-level partnerships (involving a specific project with different actors)
Industry-level alliances (involving all actors in a particular sector e.g., millers)
3 = Multi-stakeholder platforms (involving actors at different stages and scales in a
combination, e.g., processors and regulators)
4 = Inter-level coordination (involving a specific collaboration between two levels
in a value chain e.g., processors and retailers)
5 = Small business food processing (focused on smaller food businesses)
6 = Large food business (focused on larger food businesses)




Perceived level of success of the fortification initiative:
1 = Failure
2 = Too early to tell
3 = Success.
Self-sustainability index
Perceived level of the sustainability of the fortification initiative:
1 = Model no longer functional or requires 100% subsidy
2 = Most from public subsidy
3 = Most from sales;
4 = 100%self-sufficient
Premix investment 1 = Yes2 = No
Premix importation 1 = Yes2 = No
Premix import challenges
1 = Delays at port
2 = High charges to import
3 = Large minimum order size
4 = Other
Business plan
1 = Plan before project
2 = Plan during project
3 = No business plan
Post-mix testing In-factory testing and ex-factory testingScored from 1—not available; to 5—fully functional and available
Standards infrastructure National standards, conformity, traceability, and laboratories accreditationScored from 1—not available; to 5—fully functional and available
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3. Results
The results section is split into three sections. We first explore the description of the sample
respondents and funding sources of the respective fortification projects they have been involved
with. This considers some of the ‘contextual’ aspects including information about the respondents,
their institutional background and the funding sources of the project(s)/businesses that they have been
associated with.
In Section 2, we look at different aspects of the chosen business model from the perspective of
the drivers identified in Figure 1. These include: firm size, targeting, legislation level; standards and
chosen business models, premix and imported elements. The final section investigates the stakeholders’
views on the reasons behind the success of fortification initiatives. A full list of the measures of
association/statistical significance between the key characteristics and success measures are found in
the Appendix A (See Table A1).
3.1. Repondents by Type of Organisation and Main Funding Source (“Context” in Figure 1)
The survey respondents ranged from a variety of backgrounds with a high proportion from
international organisations (28%) and public sector bodies (31%). The private sector and academia were
also well represented. The majority of respondents were involved in projects relating to fortified cereals
and flours (56%) (with a much lower proportion working with projects relating to complementary
foods (12%). Of those working in fortified cereals and flours, the majority (over half) were involved
in projects relating to the fortification of wheat and/or maize flour. In contrast, for those involved in
complementary foods, 52% of respondents were involved in projects that involved mixed porridges
and weaning foods (data not shown).
The fortification activities reported by those surveyed were primarily donor-led funded projects
(70%) with only a small proportion of those driven by private sector (approximately 20%) or public
sector funding in comparison (data not shown). However, public sector funds formed a much higher
proportion of the secondary source of funds, which indicates that these projects, on the whole, whilst
reliant on donor funding or private sector funding, are likely to be reliant on significant investment
from the public sector.
3.2. Firm Size, Targeting and Legislation Level (“Scale”, “Mature vs. Start-up” “Voluntary vs. Mandatory”
and in Figure 1)
Figure 2 shows the self-sustaining scores by firm size. A significant association (p < 0.05) was found
between the firm size and the self-sustaining index. As can be seen, large firms have a significantly
higher self-sustaining score than small firms. Similarly, a significantly higher perceived success score
(p < 0.05) was associated with non-targeted initiatives than those specifically targeted at a certain cohort
of the population, further illustrating the benefits of producing at scale. The degree to which legislation
stipulated also seemed to have an impact on the perceived success of projects. For example, projects that
were accompanied with mandatory fortification had a higher level (approaching significance at the
p = 0.05 level) of perceived success among respondents than voluntary projects (data not shown).
No differences were found by region. It should also be noted that a significant association (p < 0.05) was
found with the level of perceived success of the project and the degree to which it was self-sustaining.
For example, those respondents that indicated projects were self-sustaining had a significantly
higher perceived success index than for those respondents that had indicated otherwise (Figure 3).
No significant differences were found with respect to the region and the respective indexes.
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3.3. Standards and Type of Business Models (“Policy and Regulation” in Figure 1)
Figure 4 highlights the importance of approved standards in relation to the overall coverage of
the target market. Standards in this context refer to the quantity and quality of fortification and how
this is assured and/or regulated. The degree to which standards are mandatory and enforced may
be related to the business model adopted for fortification. A significant association (p < 0.05) was
found with the level of standards and the overall share of the target market. Approved standards
clearly have a higher share of the target market (in this case, the product defined as available and being
consumed by the target market) than voluntary/no standards. Moreover, a significant association was
found between the quantity fortified by the firm/project and the level of overall compliance (p < 0.05).
The implementation of a business plan before the project/whilst the project was being implemented
did not show any significant bearing on the perceived level of success compared to those that had
never had a business plan in place. However, both groups which had implemented a business plan
before the project commencement or during project implementation did have a higher mean score for
both the success and self-sustaining indexes (See Table 3). No significant differences were found by
business model either though models focusing on inter-level coordination (i.e., involving a specific
collaboration between two levels in a value chain, e.g., processors and retailers) and a large food
business (focused on large food businesses) had the highest perceived success scores (data not shown).
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Table 3. Mean and SE of the business plan implementation by the success index and self-sustaining
index (success index: 1 = failure; 2 = too early to tell; 3 = success—self-sustain index: 1 = model
no longer functional or requires 100% subsidy; 2 = most from public subsidy; 3 = most from sales;
4 = 100% self-sufficient).
Variable Name N Mean Success Score Standard Error Mean Self-Sustaining Score Standard Error
Plan before project 25 2.64 0.14 3.25 0.21
Plan during project 14 2.42 0.19 2.92 0.29
No business plan 8 2.42 0.37 2.42 0.39
p values no significant difference. Note: some respondents did not respond to this question/N/A.
3.4. Premix Importation and Challenges (“Tradable vs. non Tradable” in Figure 1)
Figure 5 highlights the premix usage among stakeholders and the level of reliance on imports.
A high proportion of projects relied on premix and/or coating (coating technology is defined as the
micronutrient premix which is added to rice kernels in a liquid fortificant mix—waxes and gums
are usually used to allow for the micronutrient layer/layers to ‘fix’ to the rice grains [3]) (77%) with
the overwhelming majority reliant on imports (85%). Challenges involved the high costs (charges
involved) and delays at the port which significantly affect usage (Figure 5).
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importance of investment in testing facilities that are within the ambit of the producers’ establishment
and away from reliance on third-party testing laboratories. Further investigation of what factors drive
a positive correlation between in-factory testing and sustainability could be an important further
research question.
Table 4. Mean scores for post-mix testing/standards infrastructure (scored on scale, i.e., from 1—not
available; to 5—available and fully functional).
Testing/Standards Type of Standards or Testing Applied Mean N Std. Dev.
Post-mix testing In-factory testing 3 50 1.69
Ex-factory testing 2.96 47 1.52
Standards
infrastructure
National standard available and applied 3.58 52 1.55
Conformity assessed by sampling, inspection,
testing and certification 3.3 50 1.54
Traceability system in place 2.88 48 1.44
Laboratories and certification bodies
accredited to international standards 3.45 51 1.53
3.5. Stakeholders’ Views on Reasons behind Successful Projects
Table 5 presents the views of stakeholders regarding the reasons behind the success of fortification
initiatives they have been involved with, which have been grouped under various themes and
sub-themes. The main themes identified are broadly grouped under government support and private
sector involvement. Legislation, enforcement and government subsidy are the sub-themes identified
under government support. For example, legislation consisted of enabling standards and regulation,
and mandating the involvement of the private sector players, whilst enforcement involved, e.g.,
monitoring/lab testing. Government subsidies in the form of training and/or equipment were also
mentioned as reasons behind successful projects (Table 5). Private sector involvement through buy-in
and attendance of training/sourcing of equipment were additional reasons provided for successful
projects. This overlaps with the government subsidy theme relating to training and equipment (Table 5).
Table 5. Reasons for the success of fortification projects by theme (N = 30).






Memorandum of understanding between government and
industry/national strategy (N = 3)
Enabling standards and regulations/mandatory inclusion by all
players in the industry made mandatory by the government,
chosen food vehicle is commonly consumed. (N = 4)
Monitoring Lab testing capacity. (N = 3)
Political will/enforcement to ensure quality monitoring. (N = 3)
Machines, premix equipment supplied by government
and/specialist training on milling. (N = 4)
Private sector involvement Buy-inEquipment/training
Willingness of millers to adopt fortification.
Effective leverage of industry association. (N = 3)
Capacity strengthening support of stakeholders including
industry support with social marketing and branding (N = 2).
Public–private partnerships (PPP) (N = 5).
Adequate supply of vitamin A premix, equipment. data
generation, (N = 4)
Note: some respondents gave multiple responses.
4. Discussion
The results have highlighted the importance of buy-in from the private sector in relation to
industrial fortification initiatives. Clearly, the size of the firm involved in the fortification initiative has
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 8862 12 of 15
a bearing on sustainability (Figure 2) given the ability of larger firms to take advantage of economies
of scale [18]. Large-scale industrial fortification has usually been successful where few firms reside
and production is centralised [2]. Thus, if scale/replicability is needed, the incorporation of medium
and larger sized firms seems to be an important contributor to success/sustainability, especially with
regards to cereals [19]. However, the higher self-sustaining scores for medium-small firms compared to
medium sized firms (Figure 2) indicates that medium-smaller sized firms may also play an important
role in fortification initiatives. For example, maize production is highly fragmented in much of
Tanzania, with a high proportion of maize flour being consumed in rural areas being produced by
small or medium sized millers in these regions. Whilst compliance and quality assurance are still
critical issues, options for increasing the scale of fortification have been found. Sanku is one example
of an initiative supporting small to medium sized maize flour milling through use of an innovative
dosifier. Sanku is able to monitor the miller’s use of the dosifier remotely (including monitoring the
amount of premix), and is able to provide maintenance assistance by visiting the mill if the dosifier
requires repair (Sanku, personal communication, 2020).
We also found that the legislation level also has a positive association with perceived success among
stakeholders. Previous research has also indicated that the importance of mandatory fortification
especially in relation to the large-scale fortification of cereals [7,19]. The enactment of mandatory
fortification legislation may be particularly useful where voluntary fortification is currently pursued
and leading to impasse. For example, Minimex (a company based in Rwanda) have initiated the
voluntary fortification of maize flour but only a tiny proportion (10%) of their produce is fortified given
it competes primarily with unfortified maize (Minimex, personal communication, 2020). Similar issues
were faced in Uzbekistan when initiating wheat flour fortification. Whilst a number of state-run mills
initiated fortification, private mills were not required to do so. In response, mandatory fortification
legislation stipulated that all mills (state-run and private) must meet fortification standards in order to
receive annual production permits [5]. However, the legislation enacted in Uzbekistan still seemed to
be silent on imported unfortified produce. Morocco, for example, enacted legislation which stipulated
that fortification of wheat flour is compulsory whether produced domestically or imported [5]. Thus,
to be effective, legislation needs to adapt to consumption patterns and market trends.
The importance of legislative measures is further reinforced by the strong relationship between
approved standards and the quantity of fortified/share of the target market. (Figure 4). A positive
correlation was also found between the level of standards and overall coverage of the target market.
Thus, this illustrates that stakeholders invariably believe that achieving an increased market share of the
fortified produce is strongly related to the level of compliance. It is estimated, however, that compliance
with standards can be as low as 50% in many LMICs (or even lower in some cases) and calls on
governments to improve inspection and enforcement have been voiced [1,20]. Similarly, fortification in
accordance with national standards is widely regarded as an essential component of overall success [2].
This is reinforced by the views of stakeholders in this study as they identified standards, monitoring/lab
testing and enforcement/regulation as important contributors to success (Table 5).
Whilst we found the importance of enforceable standards as a priority, this necessitates adequate
monitoring mechanisms including the improvement of the capacity of public laboratories to identify
non-compliance [20]. In lieu of this, we found a positive relationship between in-factory testing and
the self-sustaining index which also underscores the need for testing facilities at the producer level
to ensure programme sustainability. Whilst there are challenges in doing so, including the lack of
locally available testing devices and reagents, a number of ‘rapid-test kits and low-cost technology
options’ are now on the market and being utilised [2]. Similarly, challenges to fortification were found
relating to premix importation which included delays and high costs (Figure 5) which is confirmed by
similar findings that have explored the topic [7,20]. In addition, to improve compliance and the overall
standards of fortified produce, reducing nutrient losses related to premix will be particularly important.
For example, nutrient losses occurring during storage have been found for premix batches tested
in Kenya, thus more needs to be done to reduce such losses occurring across the supply chain [21].
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Options such as tax incentives to encourage the procurement of premix and coordination of regulatory
systems which includes the premix purchased in parallel for multiple food vehicles have been suggested
to improve efficiency and oversight [2].
Likewise a “systems” approach to monitoring has been suggested, which will help to identify
underfortified products earlier along in the value chain, including the onus on firms to improve record
keeping and safety (allowing food inspectors to play more of a validation role) by employing principles
of Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) and Hazard Analysis/Quality Analysis and Critical Control
Points (HACCP/QACCP) [20]. Improving the capacity of producers to internally monitor themselves
has also been identified as key to ensuring standards are maintained [22].
5. Conclusions
This study has sought to unpack the ‘business model’ for fortification initiatives, to identify key
drivers of success and constraints faced by stakeholders in LMICs. Our findings suggest that for
a successful business model to reach its ‘target market’, the recommendation emerges as follows:
greater coverage of fortification seems more successful at scale and with mandatory legislation and
standards that are enforced. Clearly, different approaches may be needed depending on the vehicle
chosen, consumption patterns and the desired target market. Whilst we did not find any significant
differences between regions, other authors [15] have suggested that specific country groupings exist
in relation to the scale/coverage of fortification initiatives. For example, fragile states where there is
weak governance/lack of an enabling environment limits high coverage rates, as is the case in countries
where awareness among key stakeholders and the strengthening of capacity needs to take place [15].
As found in previous research, however, larger sized firms play an important role with respect to the
industrial fortification of cereals [2,7,19]. Careful consideration is needed to create legislation that
accounts for factors, such as unfortified produce being imported/domestically produced. Moreover,
in order for fortification initiatives to be properly implemented, a plan for sustainability needs to be
built into program design a priori [5]. Given stakeholders felt business models involving a large food
business (which arguably may be less prone to failure) and projects where a business plan was in place
(prior to the commencement of the project or during the project) had higher perceived sustainability
scores among stakeholders reinforces this.
Our qualitative analysis also indicated that stakeholders believe some level of subsidy is required,
in the form of equipment/training or support with premix procurement. The adequate supply of premix
was also raised by stakeholders as a key contributor to success. Likewise, stakeholders identified
relevant standards, appropriate testing and enforcement/regulation as important contributors to success
(Table 5). This is consistent with Luthringer et al., 2016 [20] who identified seven ‘broad reaching’
recommendations to improve the overall level of fortification compliance. These included enforcement,
legislation, adequate human and financial capacity (including training, equipment etc.) and leadership,
i.e., budgetary support from the government. Other authors have also highlighted legislative issues to
be of paramount importance to the success of fortification initiatives; for example, the inclusion of
detailed protocols including defined roles and responsibilities across agencies and clearer testing and
sampling to be integrated into standards/regulation [22,23].
The findings of this study indicate a need for more in-depth evidence on delivery mechanisms
based on specific case studies (food vehicles) of practical experience across a wide sample of countries
and business cases. The discourse on business models for fortification currently lacks a typology that
is accepted across the field. The characterisation of business types would improve future research
considerably. More evidence is also needed to show how fortification models transition from externally
supported to fully self-financing. Few examples of this transition were identified in this study.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Key characteristics of the fortification initiatives and measures of success.
Characteristics of Fortification Initiatives Success Score Self-Sustainability Score Target Market
Legislation
Mandatory vs. voluntary Ns Ns Ns
Target
Non-targeted vs. targeted X X Ns
Scale
Size of firm Ns X Ns
Standards











E.g., Business plan before or at
implementation vs. no business plan Ns Ns Ns
Type of Business model
Value chain level vs. inter-level
coordination vs. large scale, etc. Ns Ns Ns
Region Ns Ns Ns
Success X Ns
Ns = non-significant X = significant p < 0.05.
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